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Executive summary:
Analysis of cocoa powder demand shows that price is not a major determinant of cocoa powder
demand. In the countries where price systematically affects powder consumption, the elasticity is
quite low: a ten per cent price increase for powder would result only in a 1 to 3.5 per cent decrease in
consumption. Total demand for cocoa powder is found to be very sensitive to average income,
indicating that cocoa powder is used in products which belong in the luxury-end of final product
markets. Cocoa powder supply is closely tied to the supply of cocoa butter. Since butter is the cocoa
product which fetches the highest price, capacity use in the cocoa products industry is geared towards
the demand for butter. The industry has an innate tendency to produce an oversupply of cocoa powder,
since powder demand follows a pattern different from that of butter. Powder prices cannot be trusted
upon to bring equilibrium in the powder market, since price elasticity of demand is very low. Sales
proceeds from powder are also too important for the profitability of the cocoa products industry to
dispose of powder surpluses at dump prices. The solution is found in strategic stockholding, as
powder is relatively easy to store. The complex market relations in the intermediate cocoa products
industry are expressed formally in an integrated simulation model of the cocoa economy, focusing on
the relation between chocolate demand and the market for intermediate cocoa products. It is shown on
the basis of this model, that a fall in the demand for butter will improve the price for cocoa powder.
Empirical testing of this relation yielded strong evidence that an inverse relation exists between the
price of butter and that of powder in countries with a domestic cocoa-processing industry.3
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyse the position of cocoa powder markets in the context of the
international cocoa economy. Cocoa powder is an intermediate cocoa product jointly
produced with cocoa butter. The demand and supply situation of cocoa butter affects the
market for cocoa powder, and vice versa. Analysis of developments in an intermediate
industry like the cocoa-processing industry has to consider the relations with the primary
industry (the market for cocoa) and with final products markets (chocolate and non-
chocolate food products). The report tries to clarify these sometimes complex relations.
This study report forms a part of a wider research project which presents an analysis and
a model of the world cocoa economy including the consumption of chocolate and other
cocoa products for forecasting and policy evaluation. The model will make it possible to
analyse the effects of the use of cocoa butter substitutes on the world cocoa economy, and
the cocoa-exporting countries more in particular. The work continues on earlier work done
by ESI researchers on the world cocoa economy. A draft of this report has been discussed
with representatives of the Dutch and international cocoa products industry. Their comments
have contributed  to an improvement of the report. However, responsibility for any
remaining errors or misinterpretations rests completely with the author.
Section 2 presents a brief overview of the market for cocoa powder and its links with
other parts of the cocoa industry. Section 3 analyses the dynamics of cocoa powder supply.
Section 4 concentrates on the demand for cocoa powder. Section 5 presents a synthetic
theoretical model which positions the cocoa powder industry in the context of the overall
cocoa economy. All main conclusions are brought together in Section 6.
2 The market for cocoa powder: an overview
After cocoa beans are pealed, cleaned and roasted, they are shelled. Subsequently they pass
through huskers to separate the shells, husks and germs from the nibs (broken pieces of
kernels). The next phase is that roasted nibs are ground, resulting in a cocoa liquor mass.
After cooling the liquor mass solidifies into liquor blocks, which can easily be transported
and traded. Cocoa liquor can be used directly as an input for chocolate production, or it can
be further processed. By hydraulic pressing of the liquor blocks, most of the liquor’s fat
content can be freed in the form of cocoa butter, a light-yellow substance with a faint cocoa
smell. Cocoa butter is the chocolate ingredient which is mainly responsible for the product’s
smelting characteristics. What remains of the liquor is a press cake which still contains some
fat. After pulverising this cake, cocoa powder is obtained. It carries the typical colour, smell
and taste of cocoa. It is mainly used outside the chocolate industry, in a large number of food
industry products. It is important to note that cocoa powder is normally produced as a side-
product of the more valuable cocoa butter. For the cocoa products industry in general,
powder sales nevertheless form a substantial contribution to profitability. The Dutch cocoa
products industry is a special case, since it has developed, through research, cocoa powder
into a premium product.4
Most of the cocoa products industry is still situated in OECD countries as Graph 1 shows,
with a dominant role for Western Europe. The share of African and Asian grindings has
clearly increased since 1975, while grindings in South America suffered from a setback since
the mid-1980s.
At a country level, the production of intermediate cocoa products has since 1975 become
even more concentrated in a few countries. This holds both for the group of developing
countries and for the OECD countries. While the collective ‘market share’ of developing
countries remained virtually unchanged between 1975 and 1995, a group of four countries
(Brazil, Ivory Coast, Malaysia and Indonesia) managed to increase the share of world
grindings from 12 per cent to 20 per cent. A likewise spectacular concentration took place in
Western Europe, where four countries (Netherlands, Germany, UK and France) had their
share in world grindings increased from 24 in 1975 to 35 per cent in 1995.














0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400



























This location shift in world-wide grindings also had direct repercussions for the world cocoa
powder industry. European and Asian cocoa product exports grew at the expense of the
African share in the world market.
1 Particularly Ghana and Cameroon experienced a sharp
drop in international market share. The Netherlands improved its leading market position and
now supplies more than one third of world exports. Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia
quickly gained market share over the past two decades. After a strong growth of Brazilian
powder exports up to 1985, this country fell back again in 1995, due to problems in domestic
cocoa supply. The US is not a major player in world exports of cocoa powder. Further
country details can be found in Table 1.
International import demand used to stem mainly from the US and Western Europe
twenty years ago, but nowadays the market has become more geographically diversified.
While world import volume more than doubled in this period, other market regions now
account for approximately one-third of all cocoa powder imports. The regional shifts in
international cocoa powder demand are pictured in Graph 5. US import demand grew much
slower than overall demand. Within Europe, Germany, Spain and France became the major
import markets. Notable growth markets are Latin America (especially Mexico) and Eastern
Europe, each of  which now accounts for about 7 per cent of world imports. Even stronger
                                                
1 Cf. Burger and Smit (1998b: 221-232). Some industry commentators suggested that the 1995 African
exports of  powder and cake may be underestimated. It was their impression that the Ivorian customs
authorities sometimes put the export of cakes into the cocoa liquor export category.
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growth could be recorded in developing Asia which now demands one-tenth of world-wide
imports.
  Table 1:  Exports of cocoa powder and cocoa cake
1975 1985 1995 1975 1985 1995
in metric tons % of world total
Western Europe 85420 118140 230200 46.6 47.4 57.2
  Germany 18253 29390 36382 10.0 11.8 9.0
  Netherlands 48590 72304 147047 26.5 29.0 36.6
  UK 7231 6870 11740 3.9 2.8 2.9
  France 6459 4978 16209 3.5 2.0 4.0
  Others 4887 4598 18822 2.7 1.8 4.7
USA 2208 4155 15583 1.2 1.7 3.9
S America 31862 46300 37517 17.4 18.6 9.3
  Brazil 26974 40583 28506 14.7 16.3 7.1
Japan 52 17 143 0.0 0.0 0.0
Africa 59580 61080 39040 32.5 24.5 9.7
  Ivory Coast 14614 39987 32246 8.0 16.0 8.0
  Ghana 25285 7425 2100 13.8 3.0 0.5
  Cameroon 11782 5599 3906 6.4 2.2 1.0
  Others 7899 8069 788 4.3 3.2 0.2
Asia 4340 23590 79690 2.4 9.5 19.8
  Malaysia 230 7790 29571 0.1 3.1 7.4
  Indonesia 0 4000 16128 0.0 1.6 4.0
  Singapore 3933 14554 30053 2.1 5.8 7.5
World 183410 249360 402130 100.0 100.0 100.0
  Source: ICCO, Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics, various editions.7
Table 2 illustrates the dominant position of Dutch cocoa powder exports in the world’s major
import markets, especially in the EU, but also in the large US market. The table does not
consider local powder production.
Before concluding this overview of the cocoa powder market, Graph 6 shows how average
import prices developed in some major import markets since 1970. Though countries differ
in the types and source of their cocoa powder imports, prices show a similar overall pattern
with US price typically below the European ones. The most remarkable event appears to
have been the enormous price surge of 1977-1981. In 1977/78 prices soared as a
consequence of a general rise in cocoa bean prices. The most important factor, however, was
strategic stockbuilding by cocoa powder users fearing future shortages of cocoa powder.
Their short-term purchasing activity drove up market prices for powder. Since 1988, powder
prices experienced a slightly decreasing tendency, which can be explained by a persistent
Table 2: Dutch share in country imports of cocoa powder, 1995/96




USA 103471 43382 41,9
Germany 37122 29805 80,3
France 23561 13352 56,7
Italy 15378 8376 54,5
Japan 11971 6557 54,8
Belgium 7894 6087 77,1
UK 3160 2352 74,4
Switzerland 1976 1565 79,2
Subtotal 204533 111476
Other markets 200557 35598 17,7
World 405090 147074 36,3
 Source: ICCO statistics









oversupply.  Development of powder prices will be dealt with at greater length later in this
report.
3 Dynamics of cocoa powder supply
This section will focus first on technological aspects of cocoa powder supply as a part of the
cocoa products industry. It is illustrated how technology choice can affect the supply of
cocoa powder. Afterwards, more economic factors of cocoa powder supply will be analysed.
Technological trajectories
Cocoa beans can be processed mainly by two technological trajectories. The choice of
trajectory has implications for the relative quantities in which powder and other intermediary
cocoa products come available. Investment in cocoa-processing capacity determines the
technological trajectory for the medium and long term, thereby introducing supply
inflexibility. At present, two basic technological trajectories are available to the cocoa
products industry: the grinding method and the expeller method.
Grinding method
The grinding technology is the oldest and most widely applied production trajectory, both in
cocoa-producing countries and elsewhere. The essential step in this process is that bean
kernels are finely ground after removing the husks from the beans and after roasting.
Grinding yields cocoa liquor, sometimes also referred to as cocoa mass or cocoa paste. It is a
thick fluid mass with a fat content of approximately 55 per cent. After cooling, the liquor









































mass is mostly solidified into liquor blocks.
2 In a technical sense, grinding 100 kg cocoa
beans yields approximately 83 kg cocoa liquor and 17  kg cocoa residue (husks, shells,
skins).
3 The cocoa residue represents a relatively small value. Through an extraction process
still some cocoa butter can be produced from it. The main use of the cocoa residue is its use
as cattle feed component.
Cocoa liquor can be used directly as an input for the chocolate manufacturing industry, or
it can be further processed. By hydraulic pressing, the largest part of its fat content is freed in
the form of cocoa press butter. What remains is cocoa press cake, which still holds a 10-22
per cent fat content. Pulverising this cake yields cocoa powder. Production of high-quality
cocoa powder from the cake is the technologically most challenging part of this
                                                
2 In the Netherlands it is transported in liquid form.
3 NCV (1996: 38); Schuurs (1980: 3).
Chart 1  Technology choice and the supply of cocoa products
(in parentheses: weight-based technical conversion factors, partly based on 1996 figures)
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technological trajectory. In 1996, approximately 67 per cent of all cocoa liquor was
processed into powder and butter (NCV 1996: 38). If we use the prior figure that grinding
100 kg beans yields 83 kg of liquor, this implies that 56 kg of the 83 kg cocoa liquor was
further processed. This mostly results in slightly more cocoa powder (29 kg) than cocoa
butter (27 kg).
Expeller method
The second, and newer technological trajectory in cocoa processing is the expeller method. It
entails that the fat content is directly wrung out of the beans, without grinding, thereby
producing cocoa butter (expeller butter) with cocoa cake (expeller cake) as a residual
product. In quantity terms, 100 kg of beans yields 40 kg of butter and 60 kg cake. Through
an extraction process, another 7.4 kg of cocoa butter (extraction butter) can still be generated
from the cake, leaving 52.6 kg cake residue. The extraction is often done by separate
companies or production units. Expeller cake has little remaining value; it is mainly used as
cattle feed and for the production of theobromine, a raw material for the pharmaceutical
industry.
The two technological trajectories described thus far, can be pictured as a flow diagram
(Chart  1). Typical for the expeller production trajectory is that no cocoa powder is
produced.
4 The expeller method forms a good alternative for producers which are only
interested in producing butter. The production method is simpler, requiring less capital
investment. The quality and prices of expeller butter and press butter are not identical. The
expeller process changes the molecule structure of cocoa butter in the sense that it becomes
softer ('steamed flat'), more odourless and more perishable. For these reasons, expeller butter
is not suitable for several chocolate types. Its price is generally lower compared to press
butter. The residue from the expeller process, cocoa cake, is much less valuable than press
cake, the residue of the grinding process. The latter can be used to produce cocoa powder
while expeller cake can only be used to produce extraction butter. The latter has a much
lower quality and fetches a much lower price than press butter or expeller butter.
Choice between both technological trajectories
The choice of technology trajectory can be framed in a decision model for the case that a
single company would have to decide between both processes. Basic assumption is that the
choice is determined by relative profitability of both processes. Gross margins of each
process can be expressed per unit of cocoa beans used in that process. Profitability of the
expeller method is entirely dependent on the price of cocoa butter. Because the expeller
method can also be used for damaged cocoa beans, the relative profitability of this process is
also affected by price discounts for low bean quality. Disregarding residual products, the
gross profit margin of the expeller process (hexp) amounts to:
                                                
4 Some producers (like Testa in Italy) are using the expeller cake to produce theobromine, but others
expell the nibs and mix the expeller cake with press cake.11
hexp   = (1)         (
 in which: 
pb: price of cocoa butter (press butter or expeller butter);
peb: price of extraction butter;
cexp: unit production costs of the expeller process, excl. cocoa bean costs
ceb: unit production costs of the extraction process, excl. cocoa bean costs
δ : price discount for low bean quality 
pcocoa: cocoa bean price.




q: fraction of cocoa liquor production directly used for chocolate production;
ppow: price of cocoa powder
pliq: price of cocoa liquor
cliq:  cost price of liquor production, excluding cocoa bean costs
cpow: cost price of the cocoa powder production, excluding liquor costs
cpb: cost price of  press butter production, excluding liquor costs
Assuming rational producer behaviour, a technology shift towards grinding occurs if
hg > hexp. Inspection of equations (1) and (2) indicates that many factors may cause
profitability differences. To make the comparison easier, some simplifying assumptions may
help.  It is first assumed that all cocoa liquor is processed into butter and powder (i.e. q=0).
A second assumption is that all unit cost prices remain constant over time.
5 With these
assumptions the grinding process will always be preferred if:
[0.08 pb + 0.52 ppow] > [0.074 peb + δ   pcocoa] + A   (3)
For a given level of production costs (A), relative prices of cocoa and cocoa products
determine technology choice. The grinding process yields only slightly higher butter
proceeds (0.08 pb), while also the proceeds from extraction butter (0.074 peb) are small. So,
the technology decision in fact hinges on the relation of powder proceeds and bean price
                                                
5 This makes it possible to lump all cost price elements of the profitability comparison in one constant
term:
A = [ 0.48 cpb  + 0.52 cpow + cliq - 0.4 cexp -0.074 ceb] .
The term A reflects the initial relation of overall costs prices of both processes. Because it is held constant
over time, A does not play a dynamic role in technology switch decisions.
( ) () ( ) cocoa eb eb b p 1 c p 074 0 c p 4 0 δ − − − + − . . exp
( ) () ( ) ( ) { } cocoa liq pow pow pb b liq g p c c p 0.52 c p 48 0 q 1 p q h − − − + − − + = .12
discount. The expeller process only outperforms profitability of the grinding process when
gains from bean price discounts (δ ) are higher than half the powder proceeds (0.52 ppow). The
expeller method will be preferred only when beans with a high price discount can be used, or
when powder prices are very low. Simulations with actual import prices were done for
Spain. All cost prices of the expeller/extraction process (cexp,  ceb) were, for simplifying
reasons, put at half the cost prices in the grinding/pressing process (cliq, cpow ,cp) and kept
constant over time. The results, shown in Graph 7, are that even with a 17.5 per cent bean
price discount, the expeller process would have been preferred in only two of the past 26
years.
6 No factual value can be attributed to these simulation results. However, they can be
used to show that with a zero discount the grinding/pressing method is always preferred
above the expeller/extraction method. This explains why the expeller process is in fact only
used for low-grade and damaged beans. The expeller/extraction trajectory is only profitable
when its raw material fetches low prices in the market. Most OECD countries only apply the
expeller process for damaged beans and other beans which cannot profitably be processed by
the grinding process. This holds for the processing industries in cocoa-producing countries
and elsewhere. Finally, according to industry sources, expeller capacity is sometimes
maintained for strategic reasons in order to keep the butter ratio under pressure.
The expeller method is used in several countries. European producers include the
Netherlands (Schoemaker BV), Italy and Spain. It is applied furthermore in the USA and
Malaysia. In the European Union, processing by the expeller process only accounts for a few
per cents of total bean processing. In some cocoa-exporting countries with unpromising
                                                
6 The upward tendency in gross margins probably results from disregarding cost prices increases over the
period (cost prices are held constant), while actual cocoa product prices do reflect these cost increases.



























(1) bean prices for the expeller process -/- 17.5%. 
(2) unit costs price (excl. raw materials) of expeller 
process amounts to 50% of the unit cost prices of the 
grinding process  (excl. raw materials). 13
domestic and export outlets for cocoa powder, processing industries might well prefer the
expeller technology.
7
Liquor prices and the supply of cocoa powder
The technical supply of cocoa butter and cocoa powder depends on cocoa grinding and
further processing of cocoa liquor. When more liquor is directly used for chocolate
manufacturing, less will be available for butter and powder production. Hence, the fraction
of liquor that is directly used as input for chocolate production (q in equation 2), forms a
determinant of butter and powder production. Direct liquor use for chocolate production
depends on food-chemical parameters, consumer taste (type of chocolate), quality
requirements of the chocolate industry, and on prices of cocoa butter and powder compared
to that of cocoa liquor. The chocolate industry tends to purchase its intermediate cocoa
inputs rather than doing the grinding itself.
The issue of relative prices is taken up here for further analysis. Relative prices of liquor,
powder and butter can be assumed to have an influence on input choice of the chocolate
industry. When liquor becomes relatively cheap vis-à-vis butter and powder, probably more
liquor will be used, provided this is possible within the boundaries set by national food
regulations. At present, butter is the main cocoa product since its price mostly is about 2 to 3
times the powder price. Graph 8 shows, for selected markets, the development over time of
                                                
7 The reasons for lacking export opportunities mostly are that the local powder product has a low or
inconsistent quality, an unreliable supply, or that it is not blended/mixed with other (non-local) powder
types.
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the price ratio of butter to liquor. Prices are average import prices for each of the countries.
They differ between countries, inter alia because of different types and qualities of imported
cocoa products. The general picture which emerges is that the price of butter relative to the
liquor price has fallen between 1970 and the early 1980s. In the UK the decline went on
longer, but for most countries the price ratio stabilised after 1980. Compared to the 1970s,
using butter instead of liquor has become slightly cheaper for chocolate producers.
Joint production of cocoa powder and cocoa butter
An important technical characteristic of the grinding process is that powder and butter are
produced as joint products, in approximately equal quantities. Since demand for these cocoa
products follows distinct patterns, stocks would normally build up for one of both products.
Because of its much higher price, butter normally is the main product with powder being the
side-product. In cocoa-producing countries the butter is exported but no margin is expected
from the powder which is sold at low-priced by-product on the local market. Capacity use in
the cocoa products industry will therefore be geared predominantly towards the butter
market. This also holds in most OECD countries.
8 Hence, powder stocks and powder prices
must have an accommodating role. The powder market only clears when the powder price
fluctuates inversely with stock levels. However, since profitability of grinding operations
depends on the prices of powder and butter, companies will not treat one of both cocoa
products as a purely residual side-product which can be disposed of at dump prices.
As will be shown later in Table 4 demand for cocoa powder in important OECD markets
has a low price elasticity of demand (-0.1 to -0.5) whereas in some other markets no
sensitiveness to the powder price could be established. The upshot of this is that a lower
powder price does not lead to a proportionally higher powder demand. Stock-holding is
practised for powder in order to limit excessive price fluctuations and give-away prices for
powder. Of course, such stockholding is not a solution for permanent overproduction of
cocoa powder. Powder can be stored for two years at maximum, but stocks can be recycled
and refreshed.
9 Due to these factors, oversupply of cocoa powder is an inherent trait of the
cocoa products industry in most OECD countries.
10
Taking the joint-products analysis a bit further, it can be expected that when the main
product (butter) is strong in demand, it will fetch a higher price in the market. More butter
will be produced, resulting in approximately equal amounts of additional powder. But
because powder demand does not peak simultaneously, powder stocks build up and powder
                                                
8 The Netherlands forms a somewhat atypical case, because its cocoa pressing industry is dedicated to the
production of up-market powders from which it may expect a higher margin.
9 The so-called 'nearby powder' that becomes too old and can no longer be stored, is sometimes sold at
discount prices ($0.25-0.30, according to industry sources) in market segments that do not too much
affect the core powder business. No public data are available on the size of company powder stocks and
their development over time.
10 This is different in Southeast Asia because there is a large demand in this region for cheap chocolate-
like products (compound chocolate) which is made from cocoa butter substitutes with cocoa powder.
According to Sunarcia (1995) Indonesian cocoa products industry has no problems with disposing of its
cocoa powder.15
prices deteriorate. This results in an inverse relation between the price of butter and the price
of powder.
It is interesting, in this context, to analyse how an increased use of cocoa butter
alternatives would affect the powder price. ‘Cocoa butter alternatives’ is an umbrella name
for several products with different functions (Elshof 1994). At least three types of cocoa-
butter alternatives have to be distinguished in order to derive the possible impact of their use
on the powder price:
•   cocoa-butter equivalents (CBE)
These substances have the same technical and physical characteristics as cocoa butter
(tempering fat). They can be mixed with cocoa butter in any proportion and even be used
as a 100 per cent replacement. It is possible to make chocolate on the basis of only cocoa
liquor plus CBEs, without changes in the chocolate production process. The use of CBEs
has no direct effect on cocoa powder demand. However, if it leads to lower butter
production, it will also imply lower powder production (lowering stocks) and hence an
improvement of the powder/butter price ratio.
•   cocoa-butter replacers (CBRs)
These are non-tempering fats based on oils rich in C16/C18 which makes them easy to
mix with cocoa butter. The main application of CBRs is in coatings for cookies, ice
cream, countlines or candy bars. In these applications they can replace cocoa butter up to
100 per cent. They can be mixed with high-fat cocoa powder or with cocoa liquor;
powder thus competes with liquor. The boundaries for such substitution are set by
national food quality regulations. If application of CBRs makes final products cheaper,
this may create additional demand for cocoa powder, having a positive effect on the
powder price. Whether the powder/butter price ratio changes, depends on the net impact
of  CBRs on cocoa butter demand. If the latter impact is negative, the price ratio
improves.
•   cocoa-butter substitutes (CBSs)
CBSs are non-tempering lauric fats having a high lauric acid content (C12) and produced
on the basis of fractionated and hydrogenated commodity oils (e.g. palm kernel and
coconut oil). CBSs are very difficult to mix with cocoa butter. Even mixture with high-fat
cocoa powder (>20% fat content) is difficult. In practice, CBSs are mostly used in
combination with low-fat cocoa powder (8-10% fat content). The main application of
CBSs is in coatings for cookies, ice cream, countlines or candy bars where chocolate taste
does not play a crucial role. In Asia ‘compound chocolate’ recipes are made using only 6-
16% cocoa powder, combined with 25-35% CBSs, 0-14% milk powder and 40-55%
sugar (Sunarcia 1995:7). Increased CBS use will lead to additional demand for low-fat
cocoa powders, probably more in developing country markets than in quality-sensitive
OECD-markets. Since competition from local suppliers is strongest in this powder market
segment, it is unlikely that CBSs will lead to higher powder prices.
Overall, an increased use of cocoa butter alternatives will improve the price of cocoa powder
vis-à-vis cocoa butter. Cocoa powder stocks will probably be lowered. In the extreme case,
these stocks might run out and cocoa butter, despite a lacking butter demand, would have to16
be produced in order to step up powder production. This would lead to a collapse of the
butter price, and a complete reversal of the relation between butter and powder.
11 This is of
course an extreme situation. More in general, if the use of cocoa butter alternatives leads to
less use of cocoa butter, the latter product will probably remain the main intermediate cocoa
product, but its price ratio with cocoa powder can be expected to deteriorate.
World market supply by LDC powder exporters
In order to get a good picture of the dynamics of cocoa powder supply it is worthwhile to
look at possible geographical shifts in supply, and particularly, possible tendencies for
production to shift towards developing countries. Most cocoa-producing countries aim for a
higher share in the value-added chain of cocoa processing. Their policies favour domestic
cocoa-processing industries, producing cocoa paste, butter and powder mainly for domestic
markets and exports. As shown in Table 1, a number of developing countries have become
large powder exporters over the past two decades. Brazil, Côte d’ Ivoire, Malaysia and
Singapore together supplied one third of 1995 world powder exports. Indonesia is an
upcoming world market supplier. The question is whether this development is getting further
momentum.
With Brazil as a notable exception, LDC domestic markets for powder are small, and
most cocoa products are destined for exports.
12 Up to now, several factors limit OECD
market penetration by cocoa powder produced in cocoa-producing countries:
•   Freight rates
A new tendency is that cocoa beans are being shipped increasingly as a bulk cargo. So far
this only holds for bean exports from Côte d'Ivoire, but it might become more general in
the future. Bulk shipping leads to substantial lowering of bean transport and handling
costs. This change in transport mode makes bean transport relatively cheap compared to
transport of intermediate cocoa products, thus enhancing the competitiveness of cocoa
processing in OECD countries vis-à-vis processing and exports by LDC powder
producers.
•   Quality problems
Like cocoa liquor, cocoa powder determines the taste, colour and odour of the end
products in which it is applied. Therefore, final producers have strong demand for a high
and constant quality of cocoa powder. Technical problems and climatic factors make it
difficult for producers in LDCs to produce cocoa cake and cocoa powder of good quality.
At tropical temperatures, bacteriological infestation easily leads to deterioration of
aromatic and other quality aspects. Ideally, plants should be sealed off from open air, with
air-conditioning providing for a constant temperature and humidity level. Such air-
conditioning and humidity controls means higher capital outlay and requires dependable
supplies of electrical energy; equipment mostly has to be imported from abroad. These
                                                
11 This happened in 1978 when fear arose among cocoa powder users that powder stocks might run out,
evoking a bidding-up of the powder price to extreme altitudes (e.g. Bensdorp 1995). Improved market
information nowadays probably limits the chance of such market panics.
12  Brazil ranks among the seven largest cocoa-consuming countries and has important cocoa-processing
and chocolate industries (cf. Monteiro de Carvalho & De Souza Menezes 1995).17
incremental cost elements for the production of quality cocoa powder offset the
competitive advantages of lower wages. Due to these technical problems, press cake
remaining after producing cocoa butter is often exported without further processing.
Cocoa cake from LDCs tends to fetch a lower price than cake exported by OECD
countries. The problems associated with guaranteeing a stable and high quality of cocoa
powder will in the foreseeable future remain a limiting factor for LDC powder exports to
OECD countries. Countries like Indonesia and Malaysia export most of their powder to
other developing countries and to countries in the former Soviet bloc.
•   Problems with domestic cocoa supply
Production growth in Brazil and Malaysia probably will at best be very limited, as a
consequence of  lower domestic cocoa supply. In Malaysia, labour shortages and a
development orientation towards industrialisation led to lower production of cocoa beans,
despite efforts to increase cocoa farm productivity (Musa 1995a, 1995b). Pest and disease
problems lowered domestic cocoa bean supply. The latter problems (particularly the
witches’ broom disease) have also been a very import factor in reducing the Brazilian
production of cocoa, leading to a sharply lowered export supply of cocoa powder
compared to a decade before.
The factors described so far limit the perspectives for fast growth of LDC cocoa powder
exports to OECD markets. There are, however, also some factors which improve the outlook
for growth of LDC powder exports to the OECD markets:
International investment in LDC cocoa processing
Since Côte d’ Ivoire liberalised its cocoa sector, several foreign firms invested in the Ivorian
cocoa sector. Recent foreign investments in the Ivorian cocoa sector are oriented at securing
a stable and high-quality export supply of cocoa beans. However, other foreign investments
may invigorate the Ivorian cocoa-processing sector, improve its technological standards and
international market access.
13 Such foreign investments in processing will first lead to
replacement of bean exports by liquor exports, but may well lead also to increased powder
exports in the future. Liberalisation of cocoa purchasing and exports in Cameroon and Ghana
may eventually give rise to similar developments in these export countries.
Reduction of import tariffs
Import tariffs still play a considerable role in international cocoa trade. The full European
MFN tariff for powder amounted to 16% before the Uruguay Round, thus creating an
effective import barrier. Developing countries received a preferential treatment under the
GSP scheme and under the Lomé Agreement. Countries participating in the Lomé
Convention, among which all African cocoa exporters, enjoyed a zero tariff. LDCs exporting
under the GSP scheme were confronted with a 9% import tariff which still is an effective
market entry barrier. The GSP rate for cocoa powder applies to countries like Indonesia,
Brazil and Malaysia. The GSP concession of the EU was limited with a volume ceiling. The
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations led to considerable lowering of tariff protection for
                                                
13 E.g. the joint venture between Cargill and the locally-owned company GIP (Fin. Times October 30th
1997).18
cocoa products. Table 3 gives EEC tariffs on cocoa products before and after the Uruguay
Round. The general MFN tariff on powder and the GSP tariff will be lowered stepwise to 8%
in 2001, thus improving possibilities for market access. The preferential market access
position for African Lomé countries vis-à-vis other countries will diminish due to the tariff
reduction. However, cocoa product manufacturers in non-ACP developing countries still
complain about unfair market access treatment by the EU (e.g. Sunarcia 1995).
The USA applies no tariffs on cocoa products, but has effective non-tariff barriers in the
form of phytosanitary regulations that hamper LDC market access.
Summarising the aforementioned factors, it is fair to expect no spectacular changes in
LDC powder exports to OECD countries. Quality problems, logistic developments and
production problems are not likely to be surmounted in the short to medium term. On the
other hand, lower import tariffs and increased foreign direct investment in LDC cocoa
processing will improve their possibilities to access OECD powder markets. Because LDC
powder exports enter at the low-price, low-quality end of the international powder market,
they are most likely to benefit strongly from future growth in LDC markets, especially in
Asia and Latin America. This process will, however, only materialise in the long run.
Conclusions
This section has shown that cocoa powder supply is closely tied to the supply of cocoa
butter. When butter is high in demand, press capacity is adjusted to butter demand. The
industry has an innate tendency to produce an oversupply of cocoa powder, since powder
demand follows a pattern different from that of butter. Powder prices cannot be trusted upon
to bring equilibrium in the powder market, since price elasticity of demand is very low.
Moreover, sales proceeds from powder are too important for the profitability of the cocoa
products industry to dispose of powder surpluses at dump prices. A temporary solution for
this dilemma is found in strategic stockholding, as powder is relatively easy to store. The
result of the joint production process and the different demand structures is that the prices of
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Cocoa butter, fat and oil 12 7.7 4.3 35.8
Chocolate 16,8%+sd  a) 12% + sd  a) 4.8%+sd 28.6
Note: a) sd = special duties. b) Countries participating in the Lomé Treaty enjoy a 0 % tariff, while
other developing countries are subject to a 9 % tariff under the EU’s General System of Preferences.
c) The MFN tariff is lowered in annual steps to 8 % in the year 2001, while differences between the
GSP and MFN tariffs are to disappear. Source: UNCTAD TD/B/CN.1/30/Add.1 (1995).19
cocoa butter and its ‘joint product’ cocoa powder are inversely related. If the commercial
position of cocoa butter would decline as a consequence of  increased use of cocoa butter
alternatives this is likely to result in an improved commercial position (less overproduction,
higher price) for cocoa powder. Beyond the medium term, LDC powder exports to the large
OECD countries might become more important. OECD powder producers will face
increasing competition from LDC powder producers in developing country markets,
especially in the low-priced end of the market.
4 Demand for cocoa powder
Market structure
Market outlets for cocoa powder are distinctly different from those of other intermediary
cocoa products. While cocoa butter and cocoa liquor are mainly destined for chocolate
industry, most cocoa powder is used in the non-chocolate food industry. Five market
segments and their share in total cocoa powder use can be distinguished:
14
•   bakery and biscuit industry (25%),
•   instant drinks production (25%),
•   compound confectionery (25%),
•   dairy and ice-cream production (20%),
•   other, speciality uses (5 %).
Cocoa powder is typically used for adding chocolate-like flavour and/or odour to other food
products. Cocoa powder is also used as a natural colorant for food products. Several food
industries apply cocoa powder in chocolate-like dressings, coatings or couvertures (e.g. in
cakes, biscuits and ice cream).
Because of its specific characteristics, cocoa powder mostly is an important ingredient in
the recipe in which it is used. Only relatively small quantities are needed to achieve the
required impact on flavour, colour or odour of the final food product in which powder is
applied. Understandably, food industries demand a consistent powder quality (taste, colour,
odour) because of this input’s strong impact on their final product. Bensdorp (1995:88)
estimates that cocoa powder represents on average only 4 to 5 per cent of the weight of food
recipes in which powder is used, and always less than 20 per cent of  weight. Most food
industries apply cocoa powder only in small quantities. Average order size for the powder
industry is much smaller than for the cocoa butter industry. Market concentration in the
powder-using food industries is generally lower than in the international chocolate industry
which is dominated by a handful large, global players.
The diversity of the powder-using food industry also has its implication for product
diversity. Powder is supplied with different product specifications (often between 60 and 100
                                                
14  Estimates by Bensdorp (1995 and  direct communication). The shares of each end use are broad
averages, since the distribution differs by country. Use of cocoa powder for instant drinks, for instance, is
lower in the UK, but higher in France and Spain. Use of powder in compound confectionary is much
higher in developing countries, but lower in OECD countries. Use of cocoa powder in dairy and ice cream
manufacturing is relatively higher in the Netherlands and Europe.20
types) and also pricing structure differs by powder-using  industry. Product specifications
may vary as to fat content (0 - 37%, though mostly below 22%), degree of alkalinisation,
fineness and colour. Powder types, like ‘black’ powder and non-fat powders sometimes fetch
a price premium in the market. Price premiums for speciality powders differ between
regional markets.
Non-cocoa substitutes of cocoa powder do not play an important role. US chemical
companies have been active in developing cocoa-powder substitutes. Cocoa-powder
substitutes are prepared on the basis of, for example, carob powder and beer yeast. Demand
for cocoa-powder substitutes in the USA mainly stems from low-quality applications in the
non-chocolate food industry, like mixes, drinks and pudding powders. So far, the flavour of
cocoa powder could not be reproduced synthetically. Low prices of  cocoa powder have also
prevented demand growth for powder substitutes. These substitutes would only become an
important market factor when cocoa powder prices would rise again to levels like in the late
1970s.
Factors affecting demand size
Cocoa powder is an intermediary product. Normally, when one tries to assess the relative
size of factors determining demand quantity, one focuses on demand for the main final
product(s) in which the intermediate product is used. Demand for cocoa butter can to a large
extent be derived from demand for chocolate products. However, this procedure cannot be
used for cocoa powder due to the dispersed nature of its market outlets. Each of the powder-
using industries supplies a range of products, which fit in differently in the consumer budget,
comprising both the low-end of the market (basic staple foods) and the high-end of the
market (luxury food items). Moreover, demand patterns for the powder-using industries may
differ sharply between countries. Due to these problems a different procedure is used here.
Rather than looking at final product demand, country demand for cocoa powder will be
derived directly from the country’s average income level and the price of cocoa powder. Per
capita cocoa powder demand in a country can then be represented by the following demand
function:
γ β α = p Y e D
  (4)
in which: D is domestic demand per capita for cocoa powder, e
α  is a constant which
represents country-specific general demand characteristics, Y is average income, measured as
GDP per capita in the country under consideration, p represents the cocoa powder price, β   is
the income elasticity of powder demand, and γ  is the price elasticity of powder demand. Note
that price of cocoa powder substitutes are not taken into account in this demand equation.
Three straightforward hypotheses are investigated:
A) demand for cocoa powder reacts negatively to a higher price (negative price elasticity);
and
B) cocoa powder demand reacts positively to an increase in average income (positive income
elasticity);21
C) cocoa powder is mainly applied for luxury food products. For this to be true, cocoa
powder demand should not only react positively to an increase in average income, but
demand should rise even faster (at higher incomes the consumer can afford the purchase
of more food products in which cocoa powder is applied).
15
When (in order to facilitate interpretation) the demand function is expressed in a log-linear
way, the aforementioned hypotheses lead to expected parameter signs as indicated below the
equation:
ln(D) =    α      +   β  ln(Y)   +   γ  ln(p)
  (5)
              (+/-)         (+)                (-)
Hypothesis C translates into the requirement for β  to be greater than 1.
Empirical data for testing the aforementioned hypotheses was not readily available. An
important part of the work consisted of producing a consistent and reliable data set. Cocoa
powder demand per country is calculated as apparent consumption, i.e. domestic production
plus imports minus exports. UN Industrial Statistics Yearbooks formed the source for
production data. These data are based on national reports to the UN Statistical Office, but
secrecy reasons often led to considerable underreporting and data gaps. Because of this,
production figures sometimes had to be estimated on the basis of cocoa grindings or net bean
imports using plausible and conservative bean conversion data. Trade data have been derived
mainly from UNCTAD’s  COMTRADE database. Data gaps were repaired with the help of
additional data sources and estimates.
Graph 9 shows the time profile of apparent cocoa powder consumption in the world’s
major markets. European markets show a consumption peak in 1991/92 with a slight fall in
consumption afterwards. Part of this consumption fall after 1992 can be attributed to
statistical deficiencies.
16 The main drawback of using apparent consumption is that changes
in stock levels are disregarded. In fact, it assumes that positive and negative changes in stock
levels cancel out over time.
                                                
15 For luxury products an income elasticity would be found above unity, whereas in the case of staple
foods, an income elasticity below unity (β <1) can be expected.
16  There are indications that due to increased cocoa butter production since 1992, there was an
oversupply of powder for which no immediate consumption outlets existed. However, statistical data on
trade and production always give conservative estimates of recent production, imports and exports. Often,
such data are revised upward after one or two years. The dip in apparent powder consumption since 1992
might for this statistical reason turn out to be somewhat smaller than reported in Graph 9.22
A lack of price data for cocoa powder was surmounted by using average import prices per
country, derived from UNCTAD's COMTRADE database. Tests have been performed to assess
whether there are significant disparities between import prices of different countries, but
most import prices moved over time in a very similar and consistent way (cf. Graph 6),
indicating an effective price arbitrage between countries. This fact also seems to ease off the
possible drawback that imported cocoa powders form a specific market segment in each
country, with prices different from more ‘average’ domestic powder prices.
17 Prices are
converted into national currency on the basis of nominal exchange rates. The time series
cover the period 1975-1996, and in some cases 1975-1995. Regressions performed with the
ordinary least squares (OLS) method and the error correction method produced comparable
results. The econometric results obtained with the OLS method are presented in Table 4.
With reference to the three initial hypotheses, the following conclusions can be inferred
from the estimation results.
Re. hypothesis A (price sensitivity)
The null hypothesis (prices have no effect on demand) could be firmly rejected in the case of
ten countries: France, United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, USA, Japan, Canada, Austria,
Denmark and Italy. In absolute terms, all price elasticities are lying within a plausible range,
between 0.11 and 0.51. Ten per cent price increase thus results in a 1 to 5 per cent change in
consumption. Except for Italy, the price elasticity parameter also had the predicted negative
sign, i.e. powder consumption is negatively correlated with price of powder. The result for
Italy (+0.28) is rather odd and counter-intuitive. It would imply that cocoa powder is
considered as a so-called Giffen good, of which consumption diminishes as its price falls,
e.g. because a lower price causes consumer suspicion about the product’s quality. In
                                                
17 According to industry sources, a market segmentation exists in the USA, where imported powders
generally have a higher quality and higher prices compared to domestically produced powders.
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economic theory, Giffen goods are curiosities, however. According to industry sources, the
result for Italy may well be due both to unreliable data and to the presence of an expeller
operation (Tesca) which is using the powder for extracting theobromine rather than for food
consumption uses.
The null hypothesis could not be rejected in the case of six countries: Germany,
Netherlands,
18 Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Switzerland. Although the price elasticity
parameter had the expected negative sign in three of these countries, low t-values made the
result unreliable. It means that demand in six countries shows no systematic sensitivity for
powder prices. If the powder consumption data are correct, it means that in these countries
cocoa powder tends to be used irrespective of its price.
19
                                                
18 The regression for the Netherlands has also been done with export prices and with the average of export
and import prices, but this did not yield results in a more plausible range of outcomes.
19 Powder stock variations make apparent consumption data unreliable. Industry sources suggest that this
effect applies in the case of  the Netherlands and Germany.











b) 0.53 - 0.20 0.98
Germany 
c) 0.28 - 0.03 e) 0.80
United Kingdom 
b) 0.44 -0.27 0.82
Italy 
b) 0.44 +0.28 d) 0.90
Spain 
b) 0.41 - 0.51 0.47
Austria 0.49 - 0.14 0.81
Sweden 0.23    - 0.05
  e) 0.70
Belgium 
b) 0.80    - 0.12 0.98
Netherlands 1.87 
d) +0.32 e) 0.24
Denmark 0.21 - 0.11 0.82
Finland 0.41 +0.02 e) 0.64
Ireland 0.32 - 0.10 e) 0.50
Switzerland 0.72 +0.04 e) 0.86
USA
 f) 0.42 - 0.30 0.60
Japan 0.37 - 0.22 0.82
Canada 
b) 0.46 - 0.43 0.38
Notes: a) If not specified, all found elasticities were significant at the 5 per cent
level (two-tailed) or better.  b) The regression equation included a dummy for the
years 1977 an 1978 when panic about future supply shortages led to sharp
bidding-up of prices. c)    The regression equation included a dummy for
unification (0 before 1989; 1 afterwards) which was significant at the 5% level. d)
See remark in main text.  e) Significant at less than 5% per cent (two-tailed). f)
Includes a price dummy for the years 1977-'79.24
The conclusion with respect to hypothesis A is that price is a systematic determinant of cocoa
powder use in almost two-thirds of the countries. Possible explanations for the apparent lack
of price sensitivity in the other countries are that:
•   costs of cocoa powder represent just a small share of total production costs of the recipes
in which it is applied, and/or
•   cocoa powder is too important for taste, flavour or colour of the final product so that it
cannot be replaced.
Re. hypothesis B (sensitivity to average income)
The null hypothesis (no effect of income on demand) could be strongly rejected. Strong
evidence was found in all countries that the demand for cocoa powder grows as average
income levels increase. In most countries a one per cent increase in average income leads to
a 0.4 per cent increase in per capita use of cocoa powder. Hence, economic growth clearly
matters for cocoa powder demand.
Re: hypothesis C (cocoa powder applied in luxury food products)
The third hypothesis had to be rejected. The level of the income elasticity parameter
indicates whether cocoa powder is used in luxury food products or in the staple-food end of
the final products market. Table 4 reveals that in all but one case income elasticities were in
the bandwidth between 0.21 and 0.80. It means that, holding prices constant, the share of
income devoted to goods in which cocoa powder is applied, declines as income grows. It
may thus be concluded that cocoa powder is predominantly applied in non-luxury food
products. In the largest OECD markets, demand for cocoa powder only grows by some four
per cent when income grows by ten per cent. In Scandinavia and in Germany
20 the increase
is only half of that. In Belgium and Switzerland, both countries with an important chocolate
industry, the income elasticity is two times the average. A clear statistical outlier is the
Netherlands with income elasticity having an implausibly high value. Considering the low
correlation coefficient for the Dutch demand equation, this statistical result must be
distrusted. The most likely explanation in the Dutch case is that apparent consumption data
(production minus exports plus imports) yield a biased image of  Dutch powder demand,
because changes in domestic powder stocks generate large, unsystematic biases in apparent
consumption figures.
The results so far only referred to OECD markets. If we extrapolate the results to
developing countries, the implication is that the most dynamic markets are to be found in
developing countries, particularly in Asia. Graph 5 showed that over the past two decades
the Asian share in world imports grew faster than that of any other region. Table 5 specifies
import volumes for a number of emerging import regions. Imports in India and China are
still very low, partly due to culturally determined food consumption patterns. However,
when their enormous populations grow out of poverty, so that they can afford more luxury-
like food items, this will lead to a complete overturn of current international demand patterns
                                                
20  Even after including a dummy for the unification with the former German Democratic Republic.25
for cocoa powder.
21 Economic recovery and growth in Latin America also offers
perspectives for strong demand growth. Finally, a strong backlog demand for more luxury
food items can be expected from the countries of the former Soviet Union bloc; demand
already has picked up strongly in Eastern European countries. In the pre-reform era,
chocolate products were permanently kept in short supply and product quality was poor, but
nowadays chocolate and chocolate-like products are sold in all tastes and price brackets. Per
capita consumption of chocolate and chocolate-like sweets in the Soviet Union still stands at
only one third of that in the UK and Switzerland, so that considerable demand growth can be
expected as income growth is restored (cf. Thornhill 1998).
5 The cocoa powder industry in an integrated simulation model
of the cocoa economy
Findings so far can be combined to situate the powder market in an integrated model of the
cocoa economy. A theoretical model is useful when complex market relations between a
range of interrelated variables makes intuitive interpretations and prognostications error-
prone. The model may guide applied econometric research on specific aspects of the cocoa
economy. At the end of this section, one important prediction of the model will be subjected
to empirical testing.
                                                
21 Chocolate consumption in Asia at present is less than 0.1 kg per capita per year compared to more than
5 kg in the developed countries. For the case of China, Koo (1995) made plausible that no short-term
surge in Chinese powder demand can be expected; in the medium to long term a fast demand growth can
be expected.
Table 5: Emerging import regions for cocoa powder (metric tons)
1974/75 1985/86 1996/97
Eastern Europe plus ex-Soviet Union 3300 7000 31400
Egypt .. 150 4420
Turkey 0 767 7720
Mexico .. .. 12917
Argentina .. 267 7810
Chile 400 1597 4625
South Korea 307 2256 4717
India 68 50 160
China .. 1859
a) 290
Singapore .. .. 6660
Philippines .. .. 5789
Indonesia 146 180 682
Thailand 200 748 3142
Total 4439 14874 90342
Note: a) Koo (1995:66.  Source: ICCO Quarterly bulletin of  statistics26
The model of this section focuses on the market for intermediate cocoa products, while
modelling of other aspects of the cocoa economy - like final chocolate demand and primary
cocoa supply - is held fairly simple. The latter issues are covered more comprehensively in
companion reports. Functioning of the primary cocoa market is treated at greater length in
companion reports (e.g. Burger & Smit 1999, 1998b; Burger 1996), while the market for
chocolate is covered in-depth in Burger and Smit (1998a).
Model assumptions
The underlying assumptions for the model are:
•   Strategic demand for stocks plays a role for cocoa beans and cocoa powder, but not for
liquor and butter. Strategic demand for stocks depends on the trade-off between storage
costs and expected future price gains (speculation purpose). Note that this strategic
demand for stocks can be negative.
•   Government regulations have an impact on the share of cocoa liquor in chocolate and on
the share of cocoa butter in chocolate.
•   Supply of expeller butter is modelled as a fixed fraction of total cocoa grindings,
corresponding to a fixed percentage of damaged and inferior beans.
•   To keep the final demand section of the model as simple as possible, it is assumed that
chocolate demand is solely a function of average income. Factors like demographic
structure, population growth and the consumer price of chocolate are disregarded. Later
in this section, an alternative treatment of final demand will be discussed.
•   Equations (nos. 4 and 6) are based on technically fixed average bean conversion rates in
the grinding process.
•   Normal cocoa supply is treated as exogenous here. In the complete model to be published
in companion reports, it will be endogenised.
•   Cocoa butter demand for chocolate manufacture partly depends on the price of cocoa
butter alternatives.
•   International trade aspects are left out of the model, but can be easily included at the level
of each sub-market.
•   Equation (no. 17) expresses the joint-product character of cocoa powder and press butter.27



















































Demand for butter in
chocolate: cocoa butter
demand (Dbut)28
The structure of the model sections for the cocoa bean, cocoa liquor and cocoa butter
markets have an independent solution. Conversely, the cocoa powder market depends
through two causal lines on the other sections of the industry (liquor price, press butter
supply).
Formal model
All behavioural equations are expressed in a log-linear form. Accounting equations (nos. 5,
9, 13 and 20) and technical transformation relations (nos. 4, 6 and 8) are in a linear form. A
list of variables is given below. Exogenous variables are indicated with an asterisk.
Market module for cocoa liquor and cocoa butter
(1)Scoc  =  co + c1 S*cocnorm  +  c2 Pcoc
(2)Dchoc  =  ao + a1 Y*
(3)Dliqchoc =  bo + b1 Dchoc −  b2 Pliq  + b3 G1*
(4)Dliqbut =  y Dbut
(5)Dliqtot ≡   Dliqchoc  + Dliqbut
(6)Sliq =  w Scoc
(7)Pliq =  do + d1 Pcoc  −  d2 (Sliq −  Dliqtot)
(8)Dcoc  =  z Dliqtot  +  (Dcocstock  −   Dcocstock,  t-1)
(9)Xcoc =  Xcoc, t-1  + Scoc  −  Dcoc
(10) Dcocstock =  ho + h1 (P*cocexp  −  Pcoc)  −   h2 R*
(11) Pcoc =  eo  −  e1 Xcoc + e2  Pcoc, t-1
(12) Dbut =  ko + k1 Dchoc −  k2 Pbut  + k3 G2* + k4 P*butsubst
(13) Sbut ≡   Sexpelbut  +  Spress but
(14) Spressbut =  go  + g1 (Sliq −  Dliqchoc) +  g2 Pbut
(15) Sexpelbut =   fo  + f1 Sliq  +  f2 Pbut
(16) Pbut =   no  +  n1 Pliq  −   n2 (Sbut −  Dbut)
Powder market module
(17) Spow =   qo  + q1 Spressbut  + q2 Ppow
(18) Dpow =   ro  +  r1 Y*  −   r2 Ppow  +  r3 (Dpowstock −  Dpowstock, t-1)
(19) Dpowstock=   vo + v1 (P*powexp −  Ppow)  −   v2 R*
(20) Xpow ≡    Xpow, t-1  + Spow  −  Dpow
(21) Ppow =   so  +  s1 Pliq  −  s2 Xpow
List of  endogenous variables
Dchoc , Dliqtot   Dcoc, Dbut , Dpow:  demand volume for, respectively, chocolate, cocoa liquor,
cocoa beans, cocoa butter, and  cocoa powder
Schoc , Sliq  , Scoc , Sbut , Spow:  supply volume for, respectively, chocolate, cocoa
liquor, cocoa beans, cocoa butter, and  cocoa powder
Pchoc , Pliq  , Pcoc  , Pbut , Ppow:  market price for, respectively, chocolate, cocoa
liquor, cocoa beans, cocoa butter, and  cocoa powder29
Xcoc , Xpow:  actual end-of year stocks for, respectively, cocoa
beans and cocoa powder
Dcocstock , Dpowstock:  strategic demand for stocks of, respectively, cocoa
beans and cocoa powder
Sexpelbut: supply of expeller / extraction butter
Spressbut: supply of press butter (grinding trajectory)
Dliqchoc : demand for cocoa liquor to be applied directly in chocolate manufacturing
Dliqbut  : demand for cocoa liquor for processing into cocoa butter
List of exogenous variables
Y: real income per capita in consuming country
S*cocnorm: normal cocoa bean production (per country) or production capacity,
based on area size and vintage structure of plantings
P*cocexp : expected price of cocoa beans
P*powexp: expected price of cocoa powder
R*: real interest costs and other costs of storage
G1*: government regulation determining minimal cocoa liquor content
and cocoa butter content of chocolate
G2*: government regulation factors determining allowed use of cocoa
butter alternatives in chocolate instead of cocoa butter (proposed EU
CBA directive and similar measures)
P*butsubst: price of cocoa butter alternatives
Model solution
The market module for cocoa liquor and cocoa butter is self-contained. It has 16 endogenous
variables and 16 equations which can be solved simultaneously. Subsequently, these results
can be used for recursively deriving the five remaining endogenous variables of the powder
market module.
Scenario analysis with the model
The model allows to investigate theoretical scenarios relating to actual policy questions. One
scenario related to the central question of this research project will be briefly analysed,
namely the question how the price of cocoa powder will be affected by implementation of
the proposed EU directive on cocoa butter alternatives.
In the model, this directive will increase the variable G2*. The main impacts of a policy
impulse that increases G2* can be traced through the model by a diagrammatic presentation
as in Chart 3. The policy impulse evokes a series of reactions, of which some work out
positively on the powder price, and some in a negative way. It can be assumed that the
numerical value of reaction parameter k3  is strictly negative, so that the initial effect is a
lower butter demand. Grinding volumes fall and so will the price of liquor, leading to a
lower price of cocoa powder. This line of events is the most direct one and pictured as
reaction chain 1 in Chart 3.30
The situation may change in the medium term when powder stocks get depleted (reaction
chain 2). Effects on the price of cocoa butter will cause compensatory effects (chains 3 and
4). The overall outcome depends on the numerical values of all reaction parameters.
However, the most direct effects (reaction chain 1) are probably stronger than indirect
effects reflected in reaction chains 2 and 3. Chart 3 only presents the main initial effects of
the policy impulse; further secondary effects are left out. The full impact of the  measure on
the cocoa powder price cannot any more be understood intuitively because of the many
interactions. It can be arrived at mathematically after solving the set of simultaneous model
equations. The full impact of the policy impulse (d Ppow / d G2*) can be shown to depend in a
complex way on 20 different model parameters after all secondary and higher-order effects
have been accounted for.
22
In the model, a lower chocolate cost price as a consequence of the proposed CBA
directive of the EU does not enlarge overall chocolate demand through the price channel.
The European chocolate industry has argued that an increased use of CBAs would strengthen
product flexibility for chocolate manufacturers compared to the use of only cocoa butter.
CBAs can be added in chocolate to raise its melting point, thus preventing ‘whitening’ of
chocolate at high temperatures; it would improve marketing possibilities of chocolate in
warm countries. In the present model such a demand shift could only be reflected in a higher
                                                
22 The full solution is available upon request from the author of this working paper.
Chart 3 Initial impact of more CBA use on the price of cocoa powder











































a0 parameter (fixed country-wise demand effect). An alternative modelling approach is to
add the average consumer price of chocolate as variable in the demand equation  for
chocolate (no. 2). It is necessary then to add an extra equation explaining this price from e.g.
the lagged price of cocoa liquor price and the exogenously determined price of non-cocoa
chocolate ingredients.
Partial estimation of model relations
In Section 4 of this report it was argued that the price of powder does not only depend
positively on the price of its main raw material (liquor), but also that there is a negative
relation with the price of cocoa butter. The model allows a more precise statement of this
relation.
Even without resorting to the full (but complex) simultaneous solution of the model we
already get a good insight in the relevant relations by a partial approach. By combining
equations (nos. 3, 14 and 17-21) we get:
(6)
The fixed effects term consists of all fixed-level effects, i.e. the constants plus the effects of
lagged and exogenous variables. The secondary effects run through two remaining
endogenous, non-lagged variables, namely chocolate demand (Dchoc) and total liquor supply
(Sliq). We might hypothesise that the secondary effects are relatively small, because they are
intermediated by a further range of reaction parameters. By ignoring the secondary effects
and simplifying the remaining terms of equation (6) to single symbols, we get the following
equation:
ppow  =  λ o  +  λ 1 pliq  + λ 2  pbut (7)
            +/
_      +            
_
While partial estimation can never validate an entire model, it may serve to test two
hypotheses which are reflected in the expected signs of λ 1   and λ 2, as indicated below
equation (7):
A)  The price of  cocoa powder is inversely related to the price of  cocoa butter;
B)  The price of cocoa powder is positively related to the price of cocoa liquor.
Price data for testing this equation are unit prices calculated from international trade
statistics. They all stem from UNCTAD’s COMTRADE database. Import price were used for
countries without substantial own export of intermediate cocoa products. In some cases
averages of  import and export prices were used. In the case of the Netherlands export prices
were used because exports clearly dominate imports of similar products. All prices were
inflation-corrected using national GDP deflators with 1987 as base year.
Methodologically a measurement problem arises, because prices of all intermediate cocoa
products are formed more or less simultaneously in strongly related markets, so that the
explanatory variables may be endogenous. Estimation was therefore done using an error-
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correction approach: for each country, first the long-run price equation is estimated, leading
to an error-correction term et-1 that can be used for analysis of short-term price relations.
23
The regression equation is formulated in relative changes (first differences of natural
logarithms). Regression results are presented in Table 6.
Re: hypothesis A (powder prices negatively related to butter price)
The parameter for the price of butter (λ 2) had the expected negative sign in 15 out of the 17
country cases. However, the λ 2 parameter was found to be significantly different from zero
in only eight countries, including most OECD countries with a significant cocoa-processing
industry. These results confirm the hypothesis of an inverse relation between the price of
cocoa butter and the price of cocoa powder. Apparently, the relation does not hold in most
countries which only import cocoa butter and cocoa powder. This result might be explained
by strategic pricing (regional price differentiation) applied by the cocoa products industry.
Re: hypothesis B (powder price positively related to liquor price)
The null hypothesis could be rejected firmly. Parameters found for λ 1 were significantly
different from zero in all but two countries and had the expected sign. This supports the
assumption that the price of cocoa liquor co-determines the price of cocoa powder. Table 6
also indicates that in countries with a domestic cocoa-processing industry λ 1 in most cases
was higher than in other countries.
24
                                                
23 Regression with the error-correction mechanism is based on the idea that a stable, long-term
equilibrium price underlies short-term fluctuations. Hence, ‘below the surface’ of the actual Ppow lies the
long-term equilibrium value P*pow, so that:
Ppow= α  [other, short term impacts]+ β  [P*pow]  and:
∆ Ppow= α  ∆ [other, short term impacts]+ β  [Ppow, t-1  −  P*pow].
Parameter β  represents the adaption to the long-term equilibrium. Now, supposing that equation (7) is
also the form of the long-term equilibrium P*pow, we may state the regression equation with the error-
correction mechanism as follows:
∆ Ppow = α  [λ 1 ∆ Pliq +  λ 2 ∆ Pbut] + β  [Ppow, t-1 −   λ o + λ 1Pliq, t-1 +  λ 2 Pbut, t-1] + et  ,
with the term et representing the (unexplained) regression residues. The term preceded by β   is in fact the
unexplained part in the preceding period, or: et-1. Hence, with a small simplification, we get the regression
equation:
∆ Ppow =  λ ‘1∆ Pliq + λ ‘2∆ Pbut + β  et-1 + et .
24 A possible explanation for this difference is that in the other countries more use is made of strategic
pricing (oligopolistic price margin), while in the countries with an own cocoa-processing industry import
prices for competitive reasons have to be more in line with real costs. Quality differences (e.g. prevailing
of cheap low-fat powder imports) could constitute a further explanatory factor.33
6 Conclusions
Most of the cocoa products industry is still situated in OECD countries, with a dominant role
for Western Europe. The share of African and Asian grindings has clearly increased since
1975, while grindings in South America suffered from a setback since the mid-1980s. The
location shift in world-wide grindings had direct repercussions for the cocoa powder
industry. European and Asian powder exports grew at the expense of the African share in the
world market. Particularly Ghana and Cameroon experienced a sharp drop in international
market share. The Netherlands improved its leading market position and now supplies more
than one third of world exports. Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia quickly gained market
share over the past two decades. After a strong growth of Brazilian powder exports up to
1985, this country fell back again in 1995, due to problems in domestic cocoa supply. The
US is not a major player in world exports of cocoa powder.
Twenty years ago, import demand for cocoa powder used to stem mainly from the US
and Western Europe, but the market has become more geographically diversified. While
world import volume doubled the last twenty years, US import demand stagnated, while
Table 6: Price formation for cocoa powder: regression results (equation 7), 









Countries with large intermediate cocoa-processing industry
France 0.75 (4.44) -0.15 (-1.74) 0.58 (2.96) 0.84
Germany 0.91 (6.40) -0.21 (-2.69) 0.91 (4.54) 0.85
Netherlands 1.02 (7.59) -0.31 (4.06) 0.76 (4.14) 0.86
USA 0.64 (2.71) -0.31 (-1.87) 0.21 (1.59) 0.66
Belgium 0.75 (4.19) -0.21 (-2.37) 0.50 (3.33) 0.80
United Kingdom
a) 0.43 (3.93) +0.03 (0.43)
b) 0.56 (4.23) 0.77
Countries without large intermediate cocoa-processing industry
Norway 0.85 (4.53) -0.49 (-2.18) 0.81 (28.1) 0.93
Japan 0.88 (6.39) -0.20 (-2.81) 0.55 (5.31) 0.89
Italy
a) 0.46 (2.40) -0.01 (-0.06)
b) 0.19 (1.22)
b) 0.57
Switzerland 0.32 (3.87) +0.06 (0.97)
b) 0.67 (8.74) 0.88
Ireland 0.16 (2.88) -0.00 (-0.04)
b) 0.28 (1.81) 0.42
Spain 0.37 (2.29) 0.00  (0.03)
b) 0.76 (3.53) 0.33
Denmark 0.34 (1.94) -0.03 (-0.23)




b) 0.55 (3.73) 0.71
Sweden 0.55 (3.50) -0.12 (-1.21)




+0.39 (3.66) 0.49 (3.85) 0.69
Canada 0.45 (3.59) +0.01 (0.14)
b) 0.24 (1.48)
b) 0.69
Notes: a) Average of  import and export prices have been used.  b) Parameter not significant
(significance less than 10% level, two-tailed).  c) Export prices have been used.  Data sources: all unit
prices have been calculated from UNCTAD’s COMTRADE database, and were corrected for inflation
with GDP deflators for each of the countries.34
Western Europe maintained its position as an import market for cocoa powder. Other market
regions now account for approximately one-third of all cocoa powder imports. Within
Europe, Germany, Spain and France became the major import markets.
Supply of cocoa powder is closely tied to the supply of cocoa butter. When butter is high
in demand, press capacity is adjusted to this demand. The industry has an innate tendency to
produce an oversupply of cocoa powder, since powder demand follows a pattern different
from that of butter. Powder prices cannot be trusted upon to bring equilibrium in the powder
market, since price elasticity of demand is very low. Moreover, sales proceeds from powder
are too important for the profitability of the cocoa products industry to dispose of powder
surpluses at dump prices. The solution is found in strategic stockholding, as powder is
relatively easy to store. The result of the joint production process and the different demand
structures is that the prices of cocoa butter and its ‘joint product’ cocoa powder are inversely
related. If the commercial position of cocoa butter would decline as a consequence of
increased use of cocoa butter alternatives this is likely to result in an improved commercial
position (less overproduction, higher price) for cocoa powder.
Powder exports from developing countries to the OECD will in the foreseeable future be
hampered by quality problems, logistic developments and production problems which are
unlikely to be surmounted in the short to medium term. On the other hand, lower import
tariffs and increased foreign direct investment in LDC cocoa processing will improve their
possibilities to access OECD powder markets. Because LDC powder exports enter at the
low-price, low-quality end of the international powder market, they are most likely to benefit
strongly from future growth in LDC markets, especially in Asia and Latin America. This
process will, however, only materialise in the long run.
Analysis of the factors that determine overall demand for cocoa powder (cf Section 4)
showed that the powder price has a significant impact on powder demand in two-thirds of the
OECD countries that were investigated. In the remaining countries, including a large market
such as Germany, no systematic correlation between prices and apparent powder
consumption could be established. Strong evidence was found in all countries that demand
for cocoa powder grows as average income levels increase. In OECD markets cocoa powder
appears to be predominantly applied in non-luxury food products. In the largest OECD
markets, demand for cocoa powder only grows by some four per cent when income grows by
ten per cent. In Scandinavia and in Germany (even after accounting for the German
unification) the increase is only half of that. This reaction pattern implies that, holding prices
constant, the share of income devoted to goods in which cocoa powder is applied, declines as
income grows. In developing countries and Eastern Europe a different demand pattern exists.
The food products in which cocoa powder is applied are luxury goods, for which demand
grows at a faster pace than income. The strongest growth has already been  recorded in
developing Asia and can also be expected for the future when the recent monetary problems
are overcome. Other new growth markets are Latin America (especially Mexico) and the
former Soviet bloc where a backlog demand for chocolate and chocolate-like products exists.
In absolute terms these markets are still relatively small, however. Expectations that China
will become a giant market for cocoa powder seem ill-founded, at least for the medium term.
All the main demand and supply characteristics of cocoa powder and their interactions
with other parts of the cocoa economy have been integrated in a synthetic theoretical model.35
It may be used for scenario analysis. As an example, the model was used to assess how a
higher use of cocoa butter alternatives could affect the price of cocoa powder.
Two model predictions were tested empirically: (a) that the price of  cocoa powder is
inversely related to the price of  cocoa butter; and (b) that the price of cocoa powder is
positively related to the price of cocoa liquor. The first hypothesis was strongly confirmed
for all countries with a major domestic cocoa-processing industry. In most other countries,
this result could not be established, which might be explained by strategic pricing behaviour
(regional price differentiation) of the cocoa products industry. The second hypothesis was
confirmed by the empirical findings. The price of cocoa liquor was found to be strongly
correlated to the price of cocoa powder.
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